The F119 Engine: A Success Story of Human Systems Integration in Acquisition by Liu, 2ndLt Kevin K. et al.
THE F119 ENGINE: 
A SUCCESS STORY 
OF HUMAN SYSTEMS 
INTEGRATION IN 
ACQUISITION
 2ndLt Kevin K. Liu, USMC, Ricardo Valerdi, 
Donna H. Rhodes, Col Larry Kimm, USAF, and  
Lt Col Alvis Headen, USAF
The Department of Defense recently mandated the incorpora-
tion of Human Systems Integration (HSI) early in the acquisition 
cycle to improve system performance and reduce ownership 
cost. However, little documentation of successful examples of 
HSI within the context of systems engineering exists, making 
it difficult for the acquisition community to disseminate and 
apply best practices. This article presents a case study of a 
large Air Force project that represents a successful applica-
tion of HSI. The authors explore the influence of both the Air 
Force and the project contractor. Additionally, they identify 
top-level leadership support for integrating HSI into systems 
engineering processes as key to HSI success, reinforcing the 
importance of treating HSI as an integral part of pre-Milestone 
A activities.
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Human Systems Integration (HSI) is defined as the “interdisciplinary 
technical and management processes for integrating human considerations 
within and across all system elements; an essential enabler to systems 
engineering practice” (Haskins, 2007). The primary objective of HSI is to 
integrate the human as a critical system element, regardless of whether 
humans in the system function as individuals, teams, or organizations. The 
discipline seeks to treat humans as equally important to system design as 
are other system elements, such as hardware and software.
Many stakeholders have attempted to define HSI, and the number and 
definitions of HSI domains vary by organization (Department of Defense 
[DoD], 2008). However, DoD guidance makes it clear that the ultimate 
goal of any HSI program should be to “optimize total system performance, 
minimize total ownership costs, and ensure that the system is built to 
accommodate the characteristics of the user population that will operate, 
maintain, and support the system” (DoD, 2008; Department of the Army, 
2005; Department of the Navy, 2008). Since this article documents a case 
study of HSI practice within the Air Force, we provide the nine domains of 
HSI, as highlighted on the previous page.
Large defense projects require significant systems engineering 
effort that can quickly drive up costs. At the same time, defense projects 
typically have high requirements for survivability, safety, and other human 
considerations. As mentioned earlier, DoD is interested in HSI as a means 
of both reducing cost (Wallace et al., 2007), shortening acquisition 
cycles (Mack et al., 2007), and improving system performance (DoD, 
2008). Published case studies and best practices have highlighted the 
technical and economic benefits of successful HSI practice (Booher, 
1997; Landsburg et al., 2008). These studies and others have consistently 
emphasized the importance of taking HSI into consideration early in the 
acquisition process.
Although HSI evolved from the study of Human Factors, it expands 
upon the latter discipline by incorporating a broader range of human 
considerations such as occupational health, training, and survivability over 
the system life cycle. Depending on the particular definitions being used, 
the areas covered by Human Factors and HSI can overlap. The best way to 
understand the differences between the two terms is that HSI is at heart 
a subset of systems engineering. HSI work must take place in conjunction 
with systems engineering and applies to all the same acquisition phases. 
Historically, many engineers have tended to view human factors (and 
therefore HSI) as a means of identifying problems with a design, rather 
than as an enabler of good design (Harrison & Forster, 2003). Although 
HSI analyses in the later phases of acquisition are an important part of HSI 
success, the case study presented in this article focuses on the role and 
impacts of HSI in systems engineering throughout the acquisition life cycle.
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Method
This case study documents HSI activities during the development of 
Pratt & Whitney’s F119 engine, which powers the $143 million Lockheed 
Martin F-22 Raptor fighter aircraft (Drew, 2008). The F-22 Raptor (Figure 1) 
fulfils the air superiority role in the Air Force by using a package of 
technologies to allow pilots to “track, identify, shoot, and kill air-to-air 
threats before being detected” (Department of the Air Force, 2008b). 
Although the Air Force HSI Office was not formalized until 2007, much of 
the work done on the F-22 and F119 in the 1980s and 1990s spans the 
domains of HSI, making the F119 a best practice of HSI in the Air Force.
In designing the study, we followed Yin’s (2003) approach for 
identifying five important components to case study design: 1) a study's 
questions, 2) its proposition, 3) its units of analysis, 4) the logic linking the 
data to the propositions, and 5) the criteria for interpreting the findings.
FiGurE 1. tHE F-22 raPtor 
Flying High. The Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptor is a fifth-generation fighter 
aircraft that uses stealth technology. It was designed primarily as an air superiority 
fighter, but has additional capabilities that include ground attack, electronic warfare, 
and signals intelligence roles. The Raptor was first introduced into the U.S. Air Force in 
December 2005. Retrieved 2009 from Inside AF.mil [Web page] at http://www.af.mil/
shared/media/photodb/photos/090123-F-2828D-942.JPG. U.S. Air Force photo by 
Air Force Master Sgt. A. Dunaway (2008)
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The case study was designed around three central research questions:
1. How did Pratt & Whitney determine how much HSI effort 
would be needed?
2. How much did HSI effort eventually cost?
3. How did HSI fit into the larger systems engineering picture?
The first two of our research questions reflect our ongoing research on 
the economics of HSI. Discussion of this case study from the perspective of 
cost estimation can be found in Liu, Valerdi, and Rhodes (2009), and Valerdi 
and Liu (2009). In this article, we address the third research question.
Since we sought to describe how the F119 became a best practice 
of HSI, we designed our study as a single-case descriptive study. Our 
proposition was that HSI effort could be isolated from the larger systems 
engineering effort spent. Initially, we hoped to establish a quantitative 
relationship between HSI cost and systems engineering cost, but were 
also interested in identifying the critical factors that led to successful HSI 
implementation. Although our third research question was originally meant 
to better our understanding of HSI cost, we found in the course of our case 
study that the role of HSI in systems engineering is not well understood and 
would benefit from the documentation of a best practice.
We sought to analyze the early development of the F119, from concept 
development until major engineering and manufacturing development 
(EMD). Our unit of analysis was the engineering organization responsible 
for HSI on the F119 at Pratt & Whitney. Since historical data on specific 
costs associated with HSI activities were not available either because data 
were not kept or the records could not be found, we depended on Pratt & 
Whitney employees familiar with the F119 to build an understanding of its 
development. We conducted a series of interviews with Pratt & Whitney 
engineers who were active in the development of the F119, in both technical 
and management roles. Based on our central proposition and research 
questions, our interviews focused both on life-cycle cost measurement as 
well as on systems engineering and HSI methodology. With this information, 
we were able to identify key HSI success factors. We concluded the case 
study by validating our results using existing literature on the F119 and the 
F-22 and by comparing the results of our interviews with multiple engineers.
eARLY AiR FoRce eMPHAsis on ReLiABiLitY AnD MAintAinABiLitY
The Defense Resources Board approved the creation of the Advanced 
Tactical Fighter (ATF) program in November of 1981 to create a military jet 
that would be able to guarantee air superiority against the Soviet Union. 
This fighter was meant to replace the F-15 Eagle, which had previously filled 
this role. A team composed of Lockheed, Boeing, and General Dynamics 
competed against Northrop Grumman to develop the fighter. In 1991, the 
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ATF contract was awarded to the Lockheed team’s F-22, powered by Pratt 
& Whitney’s F119 engine (Figure 2). Then-Secretary of the Air Force Donald 
Rice noted that an important consideration in the awarding of the contract 
was the fact that the F-22’s engines offered superior reliability and 
maintainability (Bolkcom, 2007).
The Air Force placed an emphasis on reliability and maintainability 
from the beginning of the ATF program as well as throughout the Joint 
Advanced Fighter Engine program (JAFE)—the program to develop the 
engine for the ATF. In June of 1983, four general officers representing the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force signed a joint agreement in order to “emphasize 
to the DoD and defense contractor communities the critical importance 
of improving operational system availability by making weapon system 
readiness and support enhancement high-priority areas for all our research 
and development activities” (Keith et al., 1983). Later that year, the director 
of the JAFE program sent a memorandum to participants in the program, 
including Pratt & Whitney, asking them to consider that over 50 percent of 
the Air Force budget was then devoted to logistics, and that the problem 
would only worsen (Reynolds, 1983).
FiGurE 2. F119 ENGiNE 
Cutaway of Pratt & Whitney’s (P&W) F119-PW-100 engine. Two F119-PW-100 engines 
power the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, the U.S. Air Force’s new stealth fighter. The 
F119 features a unique thrust vectoring nozzle, integrated stealth characteristics, and 
the capability to supercruise, or achieve Mach 1.5 without afterburner. Adapted from 
“Pratt & Whitney’s F119 Engine Receives ISR Approval from USAF, Surpasses 4,000 
Flight Hours, Demonstrates Unprecedented Reliability,” Pratt & Whitney Press Release, 
September 16, 2002. Retrieved 2009 from http://www.pw.utc.com/Media+Center/
Press+Releases/Pratt+&+Whitney's+F119+Engine+Receives+ISR+Approval+from+US
AF,+Surpasses+4,000+Flight+Hours,+Demonstrates+Unprecedented+Reliability.
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To address this increase in logistics cost and determine ways to develop 
creative solutions, the Air Force created the Reliability, Maintainability, & 
Sustainability (RM&S) program in 1984 (Gillette, 1994). Besides reducing 
life-cycle cost, the RM&S program also sought to address the reliability 
and durability problems that had plagued Pratt & Whitney’s previous 
F100 engine, which powered the Air Force’s F-15 Eagle. Developed in the 
1970s, the F-15 was developed specifically to counter the Russian MiG-25. 
Therefore, emphasis was placed on performance during the development 
of both the F-15 and F100. Unfortunately, the high performance of the 
F100 meant that the engine was more prone to failure and downtime. By 
the 1980s, the Russian air superiority threat was no longer as pressing 
as when the F-15 was developed, and supportability was emphasized 
over performance. As a result, the Air Force wanted improved RM&S 
not only on the F119 engine, but on development of the F-22 as a whole. 
Specific supportability goals for the F-22 were announced as early as 1983 
(Aronstein et al., 1998).
unDeRstAnDinG custoMeR neeDs
The F-22 engine competition was not the only instance in which 
Pratt & Whitney had competed with General Electric. Both companies 
had developed engines to power the Air Force’s F-16 Fighting Falcon. 
In the end, General Electric provided the majority of engines for that 
platform. Pratt & Whitney saw success in the JAFE program as critical 
to the company’s ability to continue to compete in the military engine 
market. For the F119 engine, Pratt & Whitney decided not only to meet 
the Air Force’s RM&S requirements, but to emphasize designing for the 
maintainer throughout all aspects of the program. The company’s approach 
exemplified the best practices of what is now known as HSI.
Pratt & Whitney conducted approximately 200 trade studies as 
contracted deliverables for the Air Force. Pratt & Whitney engineers also 
estimated they had conducted thousands of informal trade studies for 
internal use. These trade studies used evaluation criteria, including safety; 
supportability; reliability, maintainability, operability, and stability; and 
manpower, personnel, and training (Deskin & Yankel, 2002).
Figures of merit were developed for the trade studies to define a 
consistent set of criteria upon which to assess the trade studies. Pratt 
& Whitney engineers used these figures of merit to determine which 
engineering groups would participate in each trade study.
As is often the case in the development of complex defense systems, 
responsibilities for the various domains of HSI are distributed among 
many different organizations at Pratt & Whitney. Of the nine domains of 
HSI (see Table), seven were represented in Pratt & Whitney’s engineering 
groups. Maintainability, Survivability, Safety, Training, and Materials were all 
engineering groups at Pratt & Whitney. Manpower, Personnel, and Human 
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taBLE. NiNE DoMaiNS oF HuMaN SyStEMS iNtEGratioN
Manpower The number and mix of personnel (military, civilian, and 
contractor) authorized and available to train, operate, 
maintain, and support each system.
Personnel The human aptitudes, skills, knowledge, experience levels, 
and abilities required to operate, maintain, and support a 
system at the time it is fielded.
Training The instruction and resources required to provide 
personnel with requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to 
properly operate, maintain, and support a system.
Environment In the context of HSI, the conditions in and around the 
system and the concepts of operation that affect the 
human’s ability to function as a part of the system, as well 
as the requirements necessary to protect the system from 
the environment (e.g., radiation, temperature, acceleration 
forces, all-weather ops, day-night ops, laser exposure, air 
quality within and around the system, etc.).
Safety The application of systems engineering and systems 
management in conducting hazard, safety, and risk 
analysis in system design and development to ensure 
that all systems, subsystems, and their interfaces operate 
effectively, without sustaining failures or jeopardizing the 
safety and health of operators, maintainers, and the  
system mission.
Occupational 
Health
The consideration of design features that minimize risk 
of injury, acute and/or chronic illness or disability, and/or 
that reduce job performance of personnel who operate, 
maintain, or support the system.
Habitability Factors of living and working conditions that are necessary 
to sustain the morale, safety, health, and comfort of the 
user population that contribute directly to personnel 
effectiveness and mission accomplishment, and often 
preclude recruitment and retention problems. 
Survivability The ability of a system, including its operators, maintainers, 
and sustainers, to withstand the risk of damage, injury, loss 
of mission capability, or destruction. 
Human 
Factors 
Engineering
The comprehensive integration of human capabilities 
and limitations (cognitive, physical, sensory, and team 
dynamics) into systems design to optimize human 
interfaces and facilitate human performance in training, 
operation, maintenance, support, and sustainment of  
a system.
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Factors Engineering were taken into account by the Maintainability group. 
Human Factors Engineering also impacted the Safety group. Occupational 
Health was considered by both the Safety group and Materials group, 
which dealt with hazardous materials as one of its responsibilities. While 
there was an Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) group at Pratt 
& Whitney, it dealt with EH&S within the organization itself and did not 
impact engine design. Habitability was not an important consideration in 
the engine design.
toP-LeveL LeADeRsHiP AnD inteGRAteD PRoDuct DeveLoPMent
The major requirements for RM&S came directly from the Air Force. The 
JAFE program in particular was intended to improve RM&S by “reducing 
the parts count, eliminating maintenance nuisances such as safety wire, 
reducing special-use tools, using common fasteners, improving durability, 
improving diagnostics, etc.” (Aronstein et al., 1998). While General 
Electric made significant RM&S improvements to its F120 engine during 
this time period, Pratt & Whitney centered its competitive strategy on 
RM&S superiority.
During the Joint Advanced Fighter Engine competition, Pratt & Whitney 
participated in the Air Force’s “Blue Two” program. The name refers to the 
involvement of maintenance workers in the Air Force—“blue-suiters.” The 
program brought Pratt & Whitney engineers to Air Force maintenance 
facilities so that the engine designers could experience first-hand the 
challenges created for maintainers by their designs. Maintainers showed 
how tools were poorly designed, manuals had unclear instructions, and jobs 
supposedly meant for one person took two or more to complete safely.
Many of the features for which the F119 would come to be praised were 
a result of leadership commitment to HSI. Frank Gillette, the Chief Engineer 
of the F119, served in various leadership positions on the F119 project, 
eventually leading a team of over 900 engineers. In interviews with Pratt & 
Whitney employees familiar with the F119, Gillette was identified as a driving 
force behind ensuring buy-in to HSI principles.
When the Pratt & Whitney team returned from its Blue Two experience 
to work on the F119, Gillette captured the lessons learned from the site visits 
in a series of presentations. These presentations were then shown to every 
engineer on the F119 team. Gillette also established design ground rules 
based on the requirements of the maintainer.
One of the most important requirements for the F119 was that only five 
hand tools should be used to service the entire engine. All Line Replaceable 
Units (LRUs) would have to be “one-deep,” meaning that the engine would 
have to be serviceable without removal of any other LRUs, and each LRU 
would have to be removable using a single tool within a 20-minute window 
(Gillette, 1994). Maintenance would have to be possible while wearing 
hazardous environment protection clothing. Maintenance tasks would 
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have to accommodate the heights of maintainers from the 5th percentile 
female to the 95th percentile male+ (Gillette, 1994; Aronstein et al., 1998). 
In addition:
Built-in test and diagnostics were integrated with the aircraft 
support system, eliminating the need for a special engine support 
system. Lockwire was eliminated, and torque wrenches were no 
longer required for “B” nut installations. The engine was designed 
with built-in threadless borescope ports, axially split cases, oil 
sight gauges, and integrated diagnostics. Other improvements 
were a modular design…color-coded harnesses, interchangeable 
components, quick disconnects, automated integrated maintenance 
system, no component rigging, no trim required, computer-based 
training, electronic technical orders, and foreign object damage 
and corrosion-resistant. These advances were intended to reduce 
operational-level and intermediate-level maintenance items by 75 
percent and depot-level tools by 60 percent, with a 40 percent 
reduction in average tool weight. (Aronstein et al., 1998)
These innovations were only possible using the Integrated Product 
Development (IPD) concept. Whereas on previous projects, engineering 
groups at Pratt & Whitney each worked in their own respective disciplines, 
under IPD teams of engineers from varying disciplines were able to provide 
design engineers with the perspectives they needed to see the full impacts 
of their design decisions.
continuinG AccountABiLitY AnD enFoRceMent oF Hsi
Adoption of the IPD concept brought various stakeholders together 
early in the design process and ensured multidisciplinary input through 
design and development. As a matter of policy, whenever a design change 
needed to be made, the originating group would submit the change to be 
reviewed by a Configuration Control Board (CCB). CCBs were composed 
of senior engineers from multiple engineering groups. At CCB meetings, 
each group with a stake in a particular design change would explain the 
impacts of that change to the chair of the CCB, typically a design engineer. 
The chair would then weigh the different considerations of the design 
change and either approve/disapprove the change or recommend further 
analysis be done.
In instances when Air Force requirements needed to be changed, the 
originating group would submit a Component Integration Change Request 
(CICR), which would then be internally debated much as with design 
changes. CICRs were typically initiated when it was determined that a 
particular requirement might not be in the best interests of the customer or 
when one requirement conflicted with another. Once a CICR was finalized 
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internally by all of Pratt & Whitney’s engineering groups, it was presented 
to the Air Force, which would then make the final decision on whether a 
requirement could be eliminated, modified, or waived.
The processes for design and requirement change ensured that 
the work of one group did not create unforeseen problems for another. 
However, change requests were typically made in response to problems 
that arose during development. Although reacting to and fixing these 
problems were important, it took proactive leadership to make sure HSI 
principles were being followed even when no problems were apparent.
Frank Gillette created several policies that ensured engineers kept 
RM&S considerations constantly in mind. All part design drawings were 
required to be annotated with the tools needed to service that part. This 
helped to achieve the goal of being able to service the entire engine with 
only five hand tools (in the end, the F119 required five two-sided hand tools 
and one other tool, sometimes described as 11 tools total).
Gillette also insisted on the development of several full-scale mock-ups 
of the F119. These mock-ups came at a considerable cost (over $2 million 
each, while the cost of an engine was then about $7 million) but allowed 
engineers to see whether their designs had really achieved maintainability 
goals. Engineers were asked to service LRUs on the mock-ups by hand to 
ensure that they were each indeed only “one-deep.” When an LRU was 
shown to not meet that requirement, the teams responsible for those LRUs 
were asked to redesign them.
Hsi eFFoRts LeAD to coMPetition success
Leading up to the major EMD contracts awarded in 1991, Pratt & 
Whitney conducted 400 distinct demonstrations of the F119’s RM&S 
features. The F119 also accrued over 110,000 hours of component tests 
and 3,000 hours of full-up engine tests, representing a thirtyfold increase 
in total test hours over its predecessor, the F100 (Aronstein et al., 1998). 
Pratt & Whitney was willing to spend significant effort on demonstrating 
the F119’s RM&S features because the company had recently been beat 
out by General Electric in their competition to provide engines for the Air 
Force’s F-16 Fighting Falcon, and therefore saw the Joint Advanced Fighter 
Engine competition as its last chance to stay in the military engine market.
In 1991, both Pratt & Whitney and General Electric were awarded 
contracts worth $290 million to complete the EMD phase of competition. 
The companies were given independence as to the number and types of 
tests that would be run on their engines, while the Air Force provided safety 
oversight. As a result, Pratt & Whitney chose to log about 50 percent more 
test hours than General Electric (Aronstein et al., 1998).
General Electric chose to emphasize the performance of its F120 engine 
over RM&S, though the F120 did meet the Air Force’s RM&S requirements. 
The F120 was the world’s first flyable variable cycle engine (Hasselrot & 
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Montgomerie, 2005). This meant that the F120 was able to change from 
turbofan to turbojet configuration to achieve maximum performance in 
multiple flight situations. The F120 was tested in both Lockheed’s YF-22 and 
Northrop Grumman’s YF-23 prototypes, demonstrating better maximum 
speed and supercruise than Pratt & Whitney’s F119 in both cases (Aronstein 
et al., 1998). The dry weight of the F119 is classified, making it impossible 
to calculate its exact thrust-to-weight ratio. However, Pratt & Whitney 
advertises the F119 as a 35,000-lb thrust class engine, putting it into the 
same thrust class as the F120 (Gunston, 2007).
Despite the F120’s superior performance in the air and higher thrust-to-
weight ratio, on April 23, 1991, the Air Force chose the combination of Pratt 
& Whitney’s F119 and Lockheed’s YF-22 to be developed into the F-22. Pratt 
& Whitney had repeatedly demonstrated a better understanding of the Air 
Force’s RM&S needs, investing more time and money into demonstrations 
and internal efforts than its competitor. It also avoided the increased risk 
of developing a variable cycle engine, at the time considered a relatively 
new and untested technology. By 1991, the Air Force’s RM&S program was 
less focused on reducing downtime and more concerned with reducing 
life-cycle costs. Pratt & Whitney had presented a management plan and 
development schedule that the Air Force considered sensitive to their needs 
(Aronstein et al., 1998). On August 2, 1991, contracts worth $11 billion were 
awarded to Lockheed and Pratt & Whitney (Bolkcom, 2007), demonstrating 
the Air Force’s commitment to HSI. Pratt & Whitney’s portion was worth 
$1.375 billion alone (Aronstein et al., 1998).
KeY Hsi success FActoRs
The Air Force’s early and continuing emphasis on RM&S was captured 
via requirements. Although dating back to 2003 the General Accounting 
Office (GAO, now the Government Accountability Office) was still 
advocating for more equal consideration of reliability and maintainability 
in requirements definition (GAO, 2003), our case study showed that the 
Air Force had already understood this principle a decade prior. The Air 
Force’s initial guidance to emphasize RM&S shaped the design approach 
of all of its contractors.
The actions of both the Air Force and Pratt & Whitney were examples of 
combining top-level leadership’s role within systems engineering practices. 
The Air Force set formal requirements and expected deliverable trade 
studies, but it also set early supportability goals, released memoranda 
explaining their intent, and funded programs to show Pratt & Whitney 
engineers actual maintenance conditions. In its own right, Pratt & Whitney 
embraced the IPD approach along with IPD’s subordinate systems 
engineering processes, but also invested significant effort to develop 
mock-ups, conduct additional testing, and hold engineers accountable for 
RM&S standards.
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As a result, we identify three factors as key to the success of HSI in the 
context of systems engineering in the F119 program:
1. Air Force policy to elevate the visibility of HSI
2. Pratt & Whitney’s willingness to internalize HSI practices 
and enforce accountability for HSI
3. The integration of HSI and systems engineering in the early 
phases of the acquisition life cycle.
Conclusions
In this case study, we document an example of successful HSI. HSI 
strongly influenced the development of Pratt & Whitney’s F119 turbofan 
engine from early in the acquisition life cycle through EMD.
Many traditional systems engineering activities also were clearly 
impacted. Conversations with Pratt & Whitney engineers indicated that 
by the time HSI requirements were integrated into the engine, the cost 
of specific HSI activities could no longer be distinguished from other 
systems engineering costs. In addition, Pratt & Whitney never had a formal 
organization responsible for all HSI considerations. Instead, responsibilities 
for HSI were spread between multiple engineering groups. The lack of a 
formal HSI group did not prevent the F119 from becoming a best practice of 
HSI. To the contrary, the fact that HSI considerations were tightly coupled to 
other systems engineering practices was one the project’s major strengths.
This case study represents a first step toward establishing the role 
of HSI in the context of systems engineering. As more success stories 
are documented, the ability to disseminate best practices throughout 
the defense acquisition community will improve and will lead to reduced 
lifecycle costs and improved performance.
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